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ABSTRACT
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In 1970, 4.8 percent of the population was foreign-born, and 11.8
percent was native-born with foreign parentage (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1975, p. 116). The economic impact of immigration depends both on how
immigrants adapt to the labor market and on the adjustment process
experienced by their offspring. The traditional perception of this inter-
generational adjustment is vividly depicted by the melting pot metaphor:
over the course of two or three generations, immigrants are transformed from
a collection of diverse national origin groups into a homogeneous native
population.1 Beginning with Glazer and Moynihan (1963), modern sociological
research argues that this metaphor does not correctly portray the ethnic
experience in the United States. These studies instead suggest that many of
the cultural and economic differences among immigrant groups are transmitted
to their children, so that the heterogeneity found among today's immigrants
becomes the heterogeneity found among tomorrow's ethnic groups.
In contrast to the voluminous literature analyzing the economic impact
of immigrants, little is known about the labor market performance of their
American-born children.2 The studies of Carliner (1980) and Chiswick (1977)
compare the earnings of inunigrants with those of second- and third-
generation Americans using the 1970 Census cross-section. Both studies find
that the earnings of second-generation workers are larger than those of the
first and third generations. Although this is an interesting and
provocative fact, existing research ignores the relationship between the
national origin differentials found among immigrants and the differences2
found among the ethnic groups that make up subsequent generations.
Despite the relative disinterest in the economic mobility experienced by
immigrant households, a growing literature attempts to model inter-
generational mobility in the context of dynastic households that care about
the welfare of their children, and that transfer funds to and make human
capital investments in their offspring (Becker, 1981; Becker and Tomes,
1956; Becker and Barro, 1988), In addition, a number of empirical studies
reveal that the relationship between the earnings of fathers and sons
exhibits substantial regression towards the mean across generations.4
This paper analyzes the intergenerational mobility experienced by
immigrantsin the context of an economic model of immigration. As long as
skills are partly transferable across generations, the type of selection
thatcharacterizes theskillcomposition of the immigrant flow will be
reflected in their children. Thus the source-countrycharacteristics that
determinenational-origin wage differentials (Borjas 1987) should also play
arole in determining the wages of second-generation ethnic Americans.
The empirical analysis uses the Public Use Samples of the decennial
Censuses available between 1940 and 1970. The evidence indicates that
although there is some regression towards the mean, the average earnings of
a second-generation ethnic group are strongly influenced by the earnings of
the corresponding first-generation national origin group. In addition, the
data are consistent with the theoretical implication that source country
characteristics are an important determinant of the earnings of both first-
and second-generation Americans.3
II. Framework
First-generation workers reside in country x and consider migrating to
country y (for concreteness, the United States). The log-income
distributions facing these workers in the two countries are given by:





where w and w are the incomes in the source country and in the United
xl yl
States, respectively. The parameter p1 is the population mean of the
income distribution in the source country for the first generation, while
the parameter is the mean income faced by this generation in the United
States if all persons in the source country choose to migrate. Note that,
in general, the parameter yl will differ from the mean income of U.S.
natives. Moreover, because of the dispersion in skills among national
origin groups, the parameter p1 will also differ among these groups. The
continuous random variable v1 measures individual-specific deviations from
mean incomes in the first generation and has a finite variance.
The functional form in (1) and (2) assumes that v1 determines individual
earnings in each of the two countries-, up to a factor of proportionality.
This is equivalent to assuming that earnings are perfectly correlated across
the two countries. The factor-loading parameter vj can be interpreted as the
rate of return to skills in the source country (relative to that in the
United States), or alternatively as the ratio of the standard deviation in4
earnings between the source country and the United States.
Assume migration costs (C) are a constant fraction of the individual's
earnings in the source country (i.e., r —C/w1).If the first generation's
objective is to maximize their own income1 the index function guiding the
immigration decision is given by:
I —log(w1/(w1+C))yl - - ir)+ (1 - (3)
Immigration occurs if I > 0. Define the immigrant flow to be positively
selected when it has above-average skills (E(v1 II> 0) > 0), and
negatively selected when it has below-average skills [E(v1 II> 0) C 01.
Equation (3) implies that the immigrant flow is positively selected when iC
1, and negatively selected when q > 1. Skilled workers choose to reside in
countries that offer relatively higher payoffs for their skills.5
Skills are transmitted from generation t-l to generation t (t > I)
according to the Markov equations:
v —a+6v +€ (4) xt xt x x,t-l xt
v—a+5v +c (5) yt yt yy,t-l yt
where v1 gives the skill variable for persons in the th generation in
country j, and the parameters S and Slie between zero and one. The
random variables cand have zero means and finite variances, are xt yt
distributed independently of skills, and are uncorrelated over time.
The parameters describing the extent to which skills are transmitted5
across generations and may differ across countries, and these
differences capture the extent to which societies are "open" or "closed."
The United States, for instance, is usually considered to be an open
society. The parameter would be expected to be small, and there would be
substantial regression towards the mean in earnings across generations.
Equations (4) and (5) imply that a self-selected migration flow in the
first generation alters the skill composition of the populations in both the
United States and the source country for many subsequent generations.
National origin groups that do well in the U.S. labor market in the first
generation will tend to do well in subsequent generations. Similarly, the
offspring of national origin groups that do poorly will tend to do poorly.
This result is derived from a sim1e model where the first-generation is
selfish in the sense that it does not consider the economic impact of its
migration decision on future generations. Suppose instead that parents care
about the utility of their children.6 In the presence of perfect capital
markets, the separation theorem implies that a necessary condition for
maximizing dynastic utility is that the first generation's migration
decision also maximizes "dynastic income," the present value of the income
stream accumulated by the dynasty.
First-generation workers know that the earnings generation process for
the th generation is described by the earnings distributions:
log —
Mxt÷ (6)
log Wyt —yt+ Vyt6
where pand pmeasure the mean incomes that will be observed in the xt yt
generation; and tisthe relative price of skills in the source country,
assumed constant across generations. Mean incomes and vary across
generations because the assimilation process could affect future earnings
opportunities in the United States for subsequent generations, or because of
international differences in rates of economic growth.
Maximization of dynastic utility re4uires that individuals in the first
generation compare dynastic incomes across the two countries. because the
incomes of future generations depend on the stochastic shocks in the skill
transmission process ( and e), which are not observed by the economic
agents in the first generation, the immigration decision for risk-neutral
workers is guided by the comparison of expected incomes. Workers in the
first generation choose whichever income stream has the highest expected
value, net of migration costs. As a first-order approximation, workers





wherer is the (generational) rate of discount, and 8 is a constant.
Consider initially the case where 6 —& •sothat the twocountries
x y
exhibit the same extent of regression towards the mean in earnings.
Equation (8) indicates that positive selection will be observed when C l
and that negative selection will be observed otherwise. These are precisely
the implications of the simpler one-generation model.
Suppose now that & s 6. To understand the role played by differences7
in the skills transmission parameter, consider the case where skills are
equally rewarded in the two countries (i.e.,—1).Equation (8) indicates
that highly skilled workers will choose to reside in the country with the
highest 6, where their skills are easily transferable to their children. In
contrast, unskilled workers have little to lose by moving to a country where
skills are not easily transferable to their children, and where the earnings
opportunities of future generations are basically determined by random
shocks from thedistribution. Thus the United States is likely to attract
highly-skilled workers from countries that have relatively more open
economies and unskilled workers from closed economies.
There is a widespread perception that there is more intergenerational.
mobility in the United States than in most other countries. This suggests
that economic conditions in the United States are particularly appealing for
unskilled workers in the source 'countries, even in the absence of any
international differences in the rate of return to skills. Because of the
scarcity of data, however, this interesting proposition cannot be
systematically tested. Moreover, the available (though limited) evidence
suggests that "the overall pattern of social mobility appears to be much the
same in the industrial societies of various Western countries," including
the United States (Lipset and Bendix, 1959, p.l3).
In view of this finding, accounting for the altruistic behavior of
parents does not alter the key insight provided by the simpler one-
generation model. The relative rate of return to skills in the source
country determines the type of selection that characterizes both the
immigrant populationtheirethnic offspring, Of course, the practical
importance of this insight depends on the value of the parameter 6y' AsS
will be seen in the empirical work below, however, the degree of
transmission in the United States is sufficiently strong so that the
earnings determination process for second-generation Americans greatly
resembles that experienced by the first.
III. Data and Descriptive Analysis
The empirical analysis uses the Public Use Samples of the four decennial
censuses available between 1940 and 1970. Each of these censuses (unlike
post-1970 censuses) has the important feature that they report the
birthplace of the respondent, as well as the birthplace of the respondent's
parents. The decennial Censuses for 1940, 1950, and 1960 are a 1/100 sample
of the population, while the 1970Censusis a 2/100 sample.7
The study is restricced to men aged 25-64 in each of the Censuses, who
worked in the civilian sector in the year prior to the Census, were not
enrolled in school, and were not self-employed.5 These data allow the
precise identification of two generations of Americans: the first
generation, composed of the sample of individuals born in a foreign-country;
and the second generation, given by the sample of persons who were born in
the United States, but had at least one parent born in a foreign country.
The generation of the remaining individuals, who had both parents born in
the United States, cannot be determined exactly, but for simplicity they
will be denoted as "third-generation" Americans. Throughout the analysis,
the population of third-generation Americans includes all natives with
American-born parents, regardless of racial or ethnic origin.
The top panel of Table I reports the average (log) wage rates for first-
and second.generation Americans in each of the Censuses. These data areTABLE I




First Generation: .1848 .1082 .0818 .0383
(29.60) (13.06) 07.04) (1h45)
5Years in U.S..0159 -.0910 —.1315
(.48) (-6.45) (-18.07)
5+ Years .1883 -- .1025 .0784
(30.00) (20.29) (21.33)
5-10 Years .-- -.0220
(2.fl)




Second Generation: .2344 .1644 .1657 .150?
(28.92) (26.99) (57.56) (70.85)
ii. Adjiated Wages
i22 i2Q i22 i212
First Generation: .18Th .1008 .0761 .0746
(27.68) (12.12) (16.Th) (23.93)
5 Tears in U.S..0375 .0865 -.0709
(1.24) (-6.26) (-10.01)








Second Generation: .2314 .2383 - 1097 .1101
(21.44) (16.67) (32.54) (51.18)
Sa$Tpte Sizes:
1st Generation 26989 6316 17566 32491
2nd Generation 9926 23354 57629 100708
3rd GeneratIon 32913 43037 202901 239184
a
The tratios arereportedin parentheses. The adjusted wage differentials
control for differences in eóxation, age(andagesquared),maritaL status,
and metropolitan residence.9
differenced from the average values observed in the sample of third-
generation workers. The table also reports the summarystatisticsfor a
number of immigrant cohorts. The 1940 and 1960 Censuses permit the
identification of two waves: those who arrived in the five-year period
prior to the survey, and those who have been in the U.S. longer than five
years.9 The 1970 Census permits the identification of additional waves.
The data reveal the well-known decline in earnings (relative to third-
generation Americans) among successive immigrant cohorts (Borjas. 1985). In
1940, the typical immigrant who has been in the U.S.fewerthan five years
earned 1.6 percent more than a third-generation American. This slight wage
advantage declines to -9.1 percent in 1960 and to -13.2 percent in 1970.
Each of the Census cross-sections indicates that the second generation
has higher earnings than the first and than the third. In 1970. second-
generation workers earned 11 percent more than the first, and 3 percent more
than the third. As Carliner (1980) and Chiswick (1977) note, it seems that
second-generation Americans earn more than both their parents and their
children. This conclusion, however, is premature. In any Census cross-
section, the family ties among the three generations identifiable in the
data are tenuous. At the time of the survey, many members of the first-
generation have just arrived in the United States and have no native
descendants yet employed in the U.S. labor market, Second-generation
Americans of working age can only be descendants of immigrants who have been
in the country for at least two or three decades. Therefore, as long as
cohort differences among first-generation workers are important, and as long
as these differences are partially transmitted to their children, the
comparison of first- and second-generation earnings in a cross-section10
providesa misleading portrait of intergenerational mobility.
Similarly, the persons who can be identified as members of the "third-
generation" are a motley collection of various ethnic groups whose presence
in the United States may date 30 or 40 years, or more than 100 or 200 years.
It is also unlikely that these so-called third-generation workers are direct
descendants of the immigrants enumerated in the Census cross-section. After
all, this would require that working-age immigrants have American-born
grandchildren who are also of working age. Obviously, because of these data
problems, it is difficult to infer anything about the intergenerational
mobility experienced by the third-generation in the United States.
The Census data, however, do allow the study of economic mobility
between the first and second generations. These comparisons, however, must
be designed so as to ensure that the immigrants are the parents of the
second-generation Americans identified in the Census. A number of
alternative methodologies are available. For example, in any single Census
cross-section, immigrants who have been in the United States for a
sufficiently long period of time (and hence can have American-born children
of working age) can be compared to second-generation workers.
The 1940, 1960, and 1970 Censuses permit the contrast of the earnings of
second-generation workers with those of immigrants who have been in the U.S.
longer than five years. Although this is a crude method of ensuring
familial links across generations, the earnings advantage of second-
generation workers over their "parents" declines substantially (to about 3-6
percent) in the 1960 and 1970 Censuses after this correction is made.
A similar result can be drawn from intercensal comparisons of first- and
second-generation workers. These comparisons increase the likelihood that11
the twogenerationsare linked through family ties. The data in Table I
indicate that first-generation workers present in the 1940 Census earn about
lB percent more than third-generation workers, while first-generation
workers in the 1950 Census earn about 11 percent more than third-generation
workers,The data also show that the children of these immigrants, namely
the second-generation workers in the 1960 or 1970 Census, earn only about 15
to17 percent more than the third generation. There is only a slight
improvement, and perhaps even a decline, in the relative earnings of the
second-generation as compared to the firstj°
The bottom panel of Table I continues the descriptive analysis by
presenting the relative wage differentials after controlling for differences
in observable demographic characteristics, including education, age, marital
status, and metropolitan residence.11 The (log) wage regressions are
estimated separately for each generation in each Census. The predicted wage
of the various generations is calculated using the means of the demographic
variables observed in the sample of immigrants. The adjusted differentials
indicate that there is little improvement in relative earnings between the
first and second generations. In fact, the immigrant population in 1940 has
higher adjusted earnings than comparable second-generation workers in 1960
or 1970. The data thus hint at the possibility of some regression towards
the mean between the first and second generations.
The intercensal linkage between parents and children can be further
improved by focusing on workers in specific age groups. For example, the
children of immigrants aged 25-44 in 1940 are likely to be relatively young
in 1970, while the children of immigrants aged 45-64 in 1940 are likely to
be relatively older in 1970.12 Table 2 presents both unadjusted andTABLE 2*
Log Wage Differentials by Age Groups in 1940 and 1970
(Relative to Third Generation)
I.Unadjusted Wages
First Generation Second Generation
Groun in 1940 in 1980
Men Aged 25-44 .1975 .1624
(23.61) (52.73)
Men Aged 45-64 .1281 .1400
(12.77) (45.62)
Men Aged 25-64 .1868 .1507
(29.60) (70.85)
II. Adjusted Wa2es
First Generation Second Generation
Coup in 1940 in 1980
Men Aged 25-44 .2087 .0953
(23.11) (28.46)
Men Aged 45-64 .1484 .1209
(14.06) (38.92)
Men Aged 25-64 .1873 .1101
(27.68) (51.18)
*The t-ratios are reported in parentheses. The adjusted wage differentials
control for differences in education, age (and age squared), marital status.
and metropolitan residence.12
adjusted wage differentials among the various generations for groups aged
25-44 and 45-64 in 1940 and 1970. The (log) wage of young immigrants in
1940 (relative to young third-generation workers) is .20, while the relative
wage of their children in 1970 (many of whom would be aged 25-44 in 1970) is
.16. Similarly, older immigrants in 1940 earned about 12.8 percent more
than older third-generation workers, while their children earned about 14
percent more than older-third generation workers in 1970. Therefore,
refining the data so as to provide a better linkage between parents and
children across Censuses does not alter the implication of the descriptive
analysis. There is little increase (and there may well be a slight decline)
in relative wages between the first and second generations.
IV. National Origin and Jncenenerationaj Mobility
Studies of immigrant labor market performance have found substantial
dispersion in relative earnings among national origin groups (Borjas. 1987).
These skill differentials among national origin groups are likely to be
partially transmitted to their ethnic offspring. Table 3 begins the
analysis by reporting the earnings of first- and second-generation workers
(relative to the earnings of third-generation Americans) for a large number
of national origin groups in the 1940-1970 period. The ethnicity of second-
generation Americans is determined from the father's country of birth
(unless only the mother is foreign-born, in which case it is determined from
the mother's country of birth)J3
The source countries listed in the table are the ones which contain
sufficient observations of both first- and second-generation Americans in
the data. In each Census, the analysis is restricted to the national originTABLE 3





1st Pen. 2nd Gen. let Ge,,, 2nd Can.
1910
1st Pen, Zrd Get,.
Asia and Africa:
China --- --- --• --- -.177 .109 -.085 .149
.119 .318 .236 .131
-.011 .432 .140 .490
-.212 -.092 -.172 .072 .123 .137
-.303 .142 -.009 .183
-.249 -.065 -.123 -.058
Austria .279 .296 .168 .241 .182 .238 .266 .211
Czechoetovakia .277 .258 .109 .167 .190 .192 .192 .137
Denmark .291 .126 .039 .208 .243 .195 .190 .119
France .229 .278 .053 .236 .144 .188 .180 .220
Germany .198 .245 .190 .171 .199 .159 .229 .128
Greece -.103 -.010 -.003 .051 -.177 .145 -.103 .189
ii'.rgary .241 .315 .302 .240 .130 .242 .199 .204
IreLand .209 .343 .023 .181 .050 .184 .032 .196
ItaLy .159 .124 .111 .104 .090 .151 .054 .137
NetherLands .105 .077 .114 .227 .123 119 .133 .161
Norway .270 .140 .317 .108 .326 .107 .234 .144
PoLand .222 .165 .154 .168 .119 .188 .108 .154
PortugaL .051 .021 -.062 .102 .040 -.025 -.122 -.003
Romania .295 .216 .282 .313 .223 344 .184 .330
Spain .065 .215 -.054 .180 064 .129 - .088 .106
Sweden .262 .287 .199 .214 .209 .201 .218 .l78
Swi tnflard .198 .352 .090 .099 .155 .131 .311 .117
United kirtgdan .317 .363 .229 .267 .240 .222 .236 .208
USSR .276 .280 .200 .204 .120 .280 .150 .320











....- --- .185 .324 .101 .174
... ... .—." .111 .004 .090 -.004
.252 .159 .207 .121 .192 .130 .176 .114
-.004 -.126 -.296 -.145 -.232 .077 -.213 -.025
Jamaica ----- --- --- -.416 .043 -.095 .094
Mexico -.496 - .663 -.392 -.236 -.327 -.227 -.340 -.16113
groups which contain at least 25 observations in both the first- and second-
generation samples. In the 1940 Census, this sample restriction leads to 23
source countries (located mostly in Europe) which account for 97 percent of
the immigrant population. The selected countries listed in the table,
therefore, almost exhaust the national origin groups that could be used to
analyze the intergenerational mobility of immigrants.
Table 3 reveals substantial dispersion among ethnic groups in the
earnings of second-generation Americans. In 1970, for instance, second-
generation Americans of British ancestry earned about 20.8 percent more than
third-generation Americans, while second-generation Canadians earned 11.4
percent more, and second-generation Mexicans earned 16.1 percent less.
To assess the extent of intergenerational mobility, it is useful to
contrast the (relative) earnings of immigrants in 1940 with the (relative)
earnings of second-generation Americans in 1970. The strong relationship
between the relative earnings of the two generations is documented in Table
4, which reports CLS estimates of regressions of the form:'4
z2j(l97O) —a+ & z,j(l94O) + (9)
where zij(t) gives the earnings (relative to those of the third generation)
of the ith generation from source country j in Census year t. The
regressions were also estimated using other combinations of Census years
(such as 1940 for the first generation and 1960 for the second) without
altering the main results of the study.
The first row of Table 4 reports estimates of (9) using the unadjusted
earnings differentials presented in Table 3. The constant term indicates aTAZLE 4
Relationship Between the Earnings of the First- and SecondCenerations*
Sample gIntercept
z1(1940) &(t970) aJn Remarks
1. .0695 .4465 .691 23
(4.19) (6.85)
2. .0887 .3627 .176 22 Omits Mexico
(2.17) (2.06)
3. .0658 .2696 .553 23 Uses Adjusted
(5.67) (5.10) Wage
4. .0692 .4967 .791 23 Young Sample:
<4.40) (8.91) Men Aged 25-44
5. .0923 .3785 .498 21 Older Sample:
(5.28) (4.34) Men Aged 45-64
6. .0572 .2334 .534 23 Young Sample &
(4.74) (4.90) Adjusted Wage
7. .0876 .2433— .313 21 Older Sample &
(6.03) (2.94) Adjusted Wage
8. .0666 .5767 -.1840 .704 23
(3.94) (3.76) (-.94)
9. .0617 .2548 .0442 .556 23 Uses Adjusted
(3.72) (3.72) (.35) Wage
10. .0687 .5083 -.0157 .791 23 Young Sample
(4.04) (3.57) (-.09)
11. .0952 .4305 -.0818 .502 21 Older Sample
(4.91) (2.67) (-.39)
12. .0445 .2760 .1345 .698 23 Young Sample &
(2.47) (2.23) (.22) Adjusted Wage
13. .0800 .2016 .1134 .350 21 Older Sample &
(3.62) (2.25) (.74) Adjusted Wage
*
Thet-ratios are reported ittparentheses.14
7.0percentincrease in earnings potential across generations that is common
to all national origin groups. One plausible reason for this upward "shift"
in the earnings profile is that second-generation Americans are not only
better educated, but also go through the American educational system, which
employers presumably value more than the schooling system of other
countries. In addition, second-generation Americans are more likely to be
proficient in English, better informed about opportunities in the U.S. labor
market, and less tied to old neighborhoods and ethnic enclaves. It is not
surprising, therefore, to find that second-generation Americans experience a
common improvement in their earnings opportunities.
Second, there is some regression towards the mean across generations,
This regression towards the mean, however, is not sufficient for national
origin to become a trivial determinant of the earnings of second-generation
Americans. In particular, the estimate of the coefficient 6 in equation (9)
is .45. This magnitude implies that even after three generations, the
earnings of third-generation ethnic groups depend on the earnings of their
immigrant grandparents. Finally, the earnings of first-generation national
origin groups explain a large fraction of the variance in the earnings of
second-generation ethnic groups (the R2 is .69).15
A potential problem with the analysis is that the data contain an
important outlier, Mexico. Both Mexican immigrants and their children
perform very poorly in the United States. This single observation could, in
principle, be driving many of the results. Row 2 of Table 4 reestimates the
regression after omitting the Mexican national origin group. Although the
estimated transmission coefficient declines somewhat (to .36), it is
apparent that this single observation is not responsible for the linkIS
between the earnings of first- and second-generation Americans.
Additional problems arise because the independent variable, the relative
wage of immigrants, may be improperly defined. In particular, the result
that all national origin groups experience a common increase in earnings
across generations is obtained from regressions which do not account for the
assimilation process experienced by the first generation. It is possible
that if the second-generation wage were related to the wage of fully
assimilated immigrants, the improvement across generations would disappear.
This measurement problem, however, is unlikely to be the source of the
positive intercept in the regressions. After all, the regressions in Table
4 use the 1940 earnings of immigrants as the independent variable. Over 9.8
million immigrants entered the United States between 1911 and 1930, but only
half a million entered during the 1930s (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 1989. p. 1). Therefore, almost all immigrants enumerated in the
1940 Census have been in the United States for more than 10 years, and are
likely to have experienced substantial assimilation.
Moreover, using the 1970 Census1 it is possible to estimate the relative
wage of immigrants who arrived in the United States prior to 1950, and who
have been in the country more than 20 years. I calculated this statistic
for each of the 32 national origin groups listed in Table 3. The
relationship between the 1970 wage of second-generation workers and the 1970
wage of this early immigrant wave is given by:




where is the wage of the th generation (relative to that of the third).
and the t-ratios are reported in parentheses. The regression coefficients
in (10) are remarkably similar to those presented in the first row of Table
6.It seems unlikely, therefore, that problems in defining the immigrant
wage are responsible for the common improvement across generations.
It is alsoof interest to determine ifthe same degree of inter-
generationalmobilityis observed between the earnings of demographically
comparable first- and second-generation Americans. The adjusted earnings
(relative to the earnings of third-generation workers) are predicted from
regressions estimated for each generation by Census and national origin
group (and are evaluated at the means of the variables observed in the
sample of immigrants). The regressors included education, age (and age
squared), marital status, and metropolitan residence.
Row 3 of Table 4 reports the estimate of equation (9) using these
adjusted differentials. The earnings of immigrants are an important
determinant of the earnings of their children, even after controlling for
differences in demographic characteristics between the groups. The
estimated & declines to .27, and the constant term declines to 6.6 percent.
The variation in the adjusted earnings of first-generation national origin
groups explains over half of the variation in the adjusted earnings of
second-generation ethnic groups.
Rows 4.7 of Table 4 report regression estimates where the (relative)
earnings of second-generation workers aged 25-44 (or 45-64) in 1970 are
related to the earnings of similarly-aged immigrants in 1940. As noted
earlier, this comparison provides a better link between parents and children
in intercensal comparisons. The regression estimates are quite similar to17
those reported above. For instance, in the wage regression for younger
workers (row 4) the intercept is 6.9 percent and the slope is .5, while in
the wage regression for older workers (row 5) the intercept is 9.2 percent
and the slope is .4.
Finally, the remaining rows of Table 4 investigate if the earnings of
second-generation workers in 1970 are related to the earnings of any other
immigrant group, not just the group observed in 1940 which is presumably
composed of their parents. Consider the regression model:
(1970) —a + 6z1j(l94O) +P z(197O)+ (11)
Equation (II) generalizes (8) by relating the 1970 earnings of second-
generation workers to the earnings of their immigrant fathers, as well as to
the earnings of immigrants present in the United States in 1970.
Rows 8-13 of Table 4 report the estimated parameters. The variable
measuring the 1970 earnings of immigrants is never significantly different
from zero, and has little effect on the remaining coefficients. Therefore,
the available data indicate that the earnings of second-generation workers
are much more heavily influenced by the earnings of their parents than by
theearnings of current immigrants from the same source country. This
finding suggests that the intercensal comparisons used in this paper provide
auseful methodology for analyzing economic mobility between first- and
second-generation Americans.
In sum, the regressions reported in Table 4 suggest two substantive
conclusions. On average, second-generation Americans experience an increase
in economic well-being relative to their parents that is not experienced by18
the third generation. This intergenerational shift increases earnings by
about 7 percent between the first and second generations. In addition,
there is a strong link between the earnings of first and second generation
workers. The intergenerational transmission parameter is sufficiently high
so that the labor market performance of immigrants will have long-ten
effects on the U.S. economy. In effect, immigration policies that alter the
skill level of the immigrant flow will also partly determine the skill level
of their children and grandchildren.
V. Source Country Characteristics and Earnings
The regressions reported in Table 4 do not directly test the
implications of the theoretical framework presented in Section II. A more
direct test pursues the insight that the same source country characteristics
determine the earnings of both immigrants and second-generation workers.
To assess the importance of source country characteristics, the wages of
first- and of second-generation Americans (relative to the wage of third-
generation workers) are related to a number of country-specific variables,
including the country's (log) per capita CNP, the extent of income
inequality in the country's income distribution, a dummy variable indicating
if the country lists English as an official language, and the distance of
the source country from the United States.16 My measure of income
inequality in the source country is given by the ratio of income accruing to
the top 10 percent of the households to the income accruing to the bottom 20
percent of the households, A key prediction of the model is that immigrant
earnings are lower if the source country has relatively high payoffs to
skills. As long as skills are partially transmitted across generations, the19
income inequality variable should have a negative impact on the earnings of
both first- and second-generation workers.
Regressions (1) and (2) of Table S show the impact of source country
characteristics on the wages of immigrants and their children. The adjusted
and unadjusted (relative) wages used in the regression are obtained from the
1970 Census.17 The "second-stage' regressions are then estimated using
generalized least squares. The data indicate that immigrant earnings are
higher if the group originates in a high-income country or in a country that
has English as an official language, and are lower if the group originates
in a country with substantial inequality in the income distribution (though
this effect is significant only in the regression that uses unadjusted
18
earnings).
Table S also documents that these source country characteristics
determine the earnings of second-generation ethnic groups in roughly the
same way. The children of immigrants earn more if their parents originated
inhigh-CM? countries or in countries where English is an official language.
These effects, however, disappear once differences in demographic
characteristics are controlled for. More important, the income inequality
variable has the same qualitative impact on the earnings of first- and
second-generation Americans. In particular, second-generation workers whose
parents originated in countries with substantial income inequality, and were
therefore more likely to be negatively selected, have lower earnings than
other ethnic groups.
The variables used as regressors in Table S measure relevant source-
country characteristics circa 1970. In principle, the per-capita income and
income inequality variables that determine the 1970 earnings of second-*
TABLE
source-Country Characteristics and the 1970 Earnings of
First- and Second-Generation Americans
First Generation Second Generation
Variable ...JJ2 Ui .111 Ui 131Iii
intercept -1.2923 i.0585 -.3551 .2808 .4578 -.0393
(-6.26)(-5.13) (-1.61) (2.17) (-2.44) C- .12)
Log(Per Capita ClIP) .1454 .1266 .0460 -.0184 .0598 .0008
(6.fl) (5.86) (2.09)(-1.39) (3.34) (.02)
1nc ine.iaLity .0l9 -.0068 -.0190 -.0110 -.0185 -.0064
(-2.41) C- .82) (—4.21)(-4.06) (-4.30) (-.71)
English isOfficiaL .1047 .0361 .0826 .0049 .0736 .0722
Language (2.80) (.97) (3.00) (.31) (3A9) (1.87)
Distance from U.S. .0326 .0264 0447 .0126 .0383 .0416
(3.43) (2.73) (4.59) (2.22) (5.41) (2.91)
First-Generation Wage --. .2392
in 1940 (1.48)
R2 .683 .611 382 .606 .891 .838
ControLs for Oemograrillc No Yes No Yes No No
Characteristic.
DeLetes Commriist No No Mo No Yes No
Co.s,tries
The t-r.tioe are reported In parentheses. The DIP VariabLe gives the (tog)
per capitaClIPinthe source cctmtryin 1970. The lrai. inequaLity variabLe
I.definedby theratio oflnccee accruing to the top 10 percent of the
househoLds to the Inca accruing to the bottom 20 percent of the househoLds.
The EngLish Ssmy variate is set to unity If the source cotsitry Lists EngLish
a.one of its officiaL Languages. The distance variable gives the rasterof
mites(in l000s) from the source country's capi tat to the nearest U.S.
gateway. The regressions have 32 observations, except for regressIon (3)
which has 25 observations.20
generation workers are those chat guided the migration decision of their
parents, and not those observed in the source country in 1970. These data,
however, are not available for most source countries prior to World War II.
The regressions for second-generation workers1 however, were reestimated
using alternative measures1 such as the 1950 per-capita ON? in the source
country, with little change in the results. Moreover, as regression (3) of
Table S indicates, the results are unaffected when the equation for second-
generation workers is reestimated in the subsample of countries that did not
undergo a Communist revolution. The omission of Communist regimes from the
sample deletes the countries where the income distribution is likely to have
changed the most over the last few decades, and reduces the measurement
error in the income inequality variable.
Finally, regression (4) of Table 5 reestimates the regression for the
second generation after including the relative income level of their parents
(in addition to the source country characteristics), The inclusion of
parental income significantly reduces the impact of both the ON? and the
income inequality variables. Source-country characteristics, therefore,
affect second-generation earnings mostly through their impact on the skill
level and earnings of immigrants, although this finding must be interpreted
with some caution because of the small number ef observations and the
multicollinearity among the variables. I should also note that this
conclusion is unchanged if the regressions (results not shown) are estimated
in the samples of first- and second-generation workers aged 25-44 or 45-64.
The available data allow one additional test of the theoretical
framework. In particular, the theory implies that increases in the size of
the immigrant flow (due perhaps to low per-capita incomes or migration21
costs) dilute the intensity of the selection. In other words, if the
immigrant flow is positively selected, an increase in the size of the
immigrant flow should be associated with lower average U.S. earnings.
Conversely, if the immigrant flaw is negatively selected, an increase in the
size of the immigrant flaw should be associated with higher average U.S.
earnings.
Consider the following regression model:
log w — +
a1 + a2 + a3 °i + c, (12)
where wi are the 1970 earnings of first- or second-generation workers
originating in country i; is the fraction of the source country's
population that migrated to the United States; ris a dummy variable set to
unity if the source country has a more unequal income distribution than the
United States and zero otherwise; and a is the income inequality variable
used earlier. The theory implies that a1 > 0, a2C0. and a3 C 0.
Table 6 presents the estimated earnings regressions for both first- and
second-generation workers. In analyzing the earnings of immigrants in 1970,
the variable p is defined as the ratio of the number of immigrants present
in the United States in 1970 to the 1970 source country's population.
Because the earnings of second-generation workers should mirror the
selection that characterized the migration of their parents, the regression
on the 1970 earnings of second-generation workers defines p as the ratio of
the number of immigrants present in the United States in 1960 to the 1940
source country's population.
The inequality variable has a negative and significant effect on thea
TABLE 6
Size of lenigrantF(o,dand the 1970 EarnIngs of
F I rat- aS Second-Geaerat I on Mime I cans
First Generation Seconi Generation
VariabLe illIiiAll LULV 111 161 111
Intercept .3842.3055 -1.0531 .2894.1817-.3768 .1759-.0218
(5.41)(5.82) (-2.52) (8.84) (9.46) (-1.34)(2.79)(-.06)
Sizeoflewlgrant (tow-0609-.0538-.0160 -.0163 -.0102-.0036-.0163-.0041
ifCotritryHasLea. (-3.fl) (-4.61) (-.69)(-1.39) (-1.59)(-.22) (-1.26)(-.16)
IneqjaLity than U.S.
Size of Inasigrant (Lois -.0115 -.0151 .0443 - .0276 -.0027 .0145-.0227.0186
ifCou-itry Has More (-.40)(-.77) C20) (-.86) (-.16) (.46) (-.31) (.21)
Inerajality than U.S.
IncaeIneqetity -.0467-.0252-.0255 -.0274 -.0126-.0217-.0127 -.0085
(-4.09)(3.06) (-2.46)(-LU) (308)(-3.50)(-1.16)(..80)
First-GenerationWage --- --- .267028
in 1940 (1.63) (1.24)
Log(Per Capita ClIP) --- --- .1281 ----- .0497 ----.0003
(3.53) (1.82) (-.01)
Engtisb is Official -- --- .1507---- .0888 --- .0771
Language (397) (2.70) (1.57)
Distance from U.S. --- --- .0372 ----- .0449 --- .0407
(2.15) (3.63) (2.30)
R2 .570 .528 .611 .639 .461 .786 745 .840
Controls for Desographic Ho Ye, Ho No Yes Ho Ho Ho
characteristics
The t-ratlos are reported in parentheses.Thesize of the isasigrant flow
Isgiven by the ratio of the fluter of (migrants In 1970 to the population
of the source cointry in 1970 in the first-generation regressions, aS by
the an ratio measured as of 1940 f or the secoS-generatlon regressions.22
earnings of both first- and second-generation workers in this alternative
specification of the model (see regressions (1) and (2)]. The sign pattern
of a1 and a2, however, is only partly consistent with the theory. For
instance, the larger the immigrant flow from a country with an egalitarian
income distribution, the lower the earnings of both first- and second-
generation workers. Increasing p in countries with more income inequality
than the United States, however, does not have a significantly positive
effect on earnings.
The additionalcolumns presented in Table 6 present alternative
specifications ofequation (12). As before, the results for the second
generation are very sensitive to the introduction of parental earnings. The
inclusion of the 1940 earnings of immigrants (which itself is only
marginally significant) greatly reduces the impact of the other variables in
the equation. In addition, expanding (12) to include other source country
characteristics (such as per-capita GNP and English language) generally
reveals that the source country characteristics are more important than the
interaction terms between income inequality and the size of the immigrant
flow (see regression (3) in Table 6).
Overall, the results in Tables S and 6 suggest that ethnic wage
differentials can, to some extent, be understood in terms of the national
origindifferences documented in immigrant labor market performance. In
particular, the same source country characteristics that determine economic
success for first-generation Americans are important determinants of the
economicsuccess of their children.
4.23
VI. Summary
Thispaper presented an analysis of the intergenerational mobility of
immigrants. As long as skills are partly transmitted across generations,
the sane types of selection that characterize the immigrant flow are likely
to characterize their offspring. Hence the same source country
characteristics that are such crucial determinants of the labor market
experiences of immigrants will influence the experiences of their children.
In effect, current immigration policy determines tomorrow's differences in
the labor market experiences of U.S. -born ethnic groups.
The empirical analysis used the four decennial Censuses available
between 1940 and 1970. These data allow the precise identification of two
generations of Americans, and indicate a significant relationship between
the earnings of the first and second generations. The data also suggest the
existence of regression towards the mean across generations. Nevertheless,
the analysis indicates that the wage of second-generation ethnic groups
crucially depends on the wage of the first-generation national origin group.
In addition, the evidence reveals that the earnings of second-generation
Americans are strongly affected by variables describing the economic
Opportunities available in the home of their ancestors.24
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I. See Gordon (1964) for a presentation of the assimilation hypothesis,
2. See, for example, Borjas (1985, 1987, l990a), Ghiswick (1978), Jasso
and Rosenzweig (1986).
3. Coldberger (1989) presents a critical appraisal of these models.
Additional theoretical studies of intergenerational mobility include Conlisk
(1974), Loury (1981).
4. See Atkinson (1981), Behrman and Taubman (1985), and Hauser, Sewell,
and Lutterman (1975)
5. A number of generalizations of the model are possible. For
instance, it is easy to allow for variable migration costs. The key results
unaffected as long as the correlation between migration costs and earnings
is not "excessive." Second, alternative host countries can be introduced.
Individuals would then compare the gains from migrating to the United States
with the gains from migrating to other countries. Under some simplifying
assumptions, this model generates a sorting where there is a positive
correlation between the average skills of persons choosing a particular
country and the rate of returns to skills in that country. Finally, the
model can be expanded to allow for remigration. Such remigration arises
when potential migrants are uncertain about earnings opportunities in the
United States, and actual economic conditions here are inferior to those25
available in the source country. It can be shown that return migration
increases the intensity of the selection process. In particular, it is the
"marginal" immigrants who are most likely to return to the source country.
6. Applications of the dynastic approach include Becker (1974) and
Becker and Barro (1989).
7. The 1940 and 1950 Censuses report some of the key variables only
for the "sample line" respondents. In the 1970 Census, a 1/100 random
sample is used for the third generation. Otherwise, all available
observations are used in the study, subject to the qualification that they
satisfy the sample restrictions and that valid data are reported.
S. This sample selection introduces biases into the analysis, but the
inclusion of non-workers or of the self-employed would require the use of
non-robust selectivity-correction techniques, or the adjustment of self-
employment incomes to make them comparable to salaried wage.
9. These data are obtained from the respondent's answer to the
question of where he was residing five years prior to the Census. If the
respondent is foreign-born, and if he resided abroad at that time, I assume
that he migrated to the United States in the five-year period. These data
are not available for the 1950 Census.
10. Note that these intercensal comparisons are contaminated by period
effects. The discussion implicitly assume that period effects (i.e., the
impact of business cycle fluctuations on the log wage) are the same for
first, second, and third generation workers, so that relative wages are
invariant over the cycle. Little is known, however, about the sensitivity
of the earnings of various ethnic groups to business cycle fluctuations.
II. The typical immigrant enumerated in the 1940 Census obtained his26
schooling in a western European country, while the typical immigrant in 1970
probably obtained his schooling in Latin American or Asia. The content and
transferability of schooling obviously differs across countries. The
secular trend in the standardized wage differentials between second
generation workers and immigrants reported in Table 1. ignores differences in
schooling quality across immigrant cohorts.
12. For instance, if most children are born while their parents are in
their 20s, men aged 45-64 in 1940 would have children aged 15-44 at that
time. By 1970, these children would be aged 45-74. In the empirical
analysis, I experimented with alter-native age groups, as well as with using
the limited year-of-migration data available in the 1940 Census to better
match parents and children. These additional specifications led to
essentially identical results.
13.It would be of interest to determine if the extent of
intergenerational mobility depends on whether both parents are foreign-born.
and if so, on whether both parents have the same national origin. I have
not pursued these questions in this paper.
14. The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares to
account for the fact that the dependent variable is only an estimate of the
true variable. The correction had little impact on the estimated parameters
or standard errors.
15. My estimate of & is at the higher end of the range usually reported
in the literature. Becker and Tomes (1986) survey the available estimates
and find that they range between .2 and .4. The higher value presented in
this paper is partly due to the aggregation within national origin groups
This aggregation probably reduces the amount of measurement error (Solon,27
1990). Moreover, even in the absence of measurement error, the estimates
from the aggregate regression and the typical individual-level regression
will differ. It is well known (Lewis, 1986, p.24) that the aggregate
regression estimates parameters from the micro regression model:
—a+1 + 2 (l) + (Fl)
where Yjj(2) represents the earnings of second-generation person i in ethnic
group j; Yjj(l) represents the earnings of his father; and Yj(l) givesthe
mean earnings of the father's ethnic group. Hence the expected earnings of
people who have similarly-skilled parents, but who come from ethnic groups
with different average skills will differ. In effect, (Fl) provides a
particular specification for an ethnic-group fixed effect in earnings (see
Borjas. 1992, for a more detailed discussion of this model). Equation (9)
can be derived from (Fl) by aggregating within ethnic groups. The estimate
of 6 in Census data, therefore, is the sum of coefficients fi1+$2 (in an
appropriately weighted regression). Note that the predicted earnings of the
son of the average father in any ethnic group depends on the sum fi1+fi2.
16.These data, with the exception of the English language variable,
are discussed in detail in Borjas (1987). The English language variable is
obtained from Paxton (1988).
17. The regressions were also estimated for other Census years, as well
as on a pooled data set. The 1970 estimates are representative of the set
of results obtained from these alternative specifications.
18. The per-capita CNPvariableplays two roles in the analysis.
First, it is likely that the skills of immigrants originating in higher per-28
capita GNP countries are more easily transferable to the U.S. labor market,
generating a positive correlation between immigrant earnings and per-capita
incomes in the source country. In addition, changes in both per-capita CNP
and distance alter the size of the immigrant flow and affect the intensity
of the selection process. This theoretical insight is discussed below.29
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